



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

TO THE GOD OF NATIONS.

O Thou before whose Throne we fall,
 Who bendest to the bended knee,
 Who spurnest none, who lovest all,
 How long, O God, from land and sea,
 Shall yet the warring nations call?

O Thou by whom the lost are found,
 Whose Cross, upraised, forever stands,
 When shall its shadow on the ground
 Spread East and West through all the lands,
 Until it gird the world around?

O Thou who makest kingdoms Thine,
 When shall Thy mighty arms outreach
 From Southern palm to Northern pine,
 To bind each human heart to each,
 And each to Thee as branch to vine?

O Thou who cleanseest human sin,
 For whom the whole creation waits,
 When shall Thy reign on earth begin?
 O be ye lifted up, ye gates,
 And let the King of Glory in!

THEODORE TILTON.

PEACE EFFORTS IN FRANCE.

If France would disband her army, other European nations would follow her example. This is generally believed in Europe; and although it may not be strictly true, there can be little doubt that so brilliant an example would have an immense moral effect on the world generally, and shame other countries into reducing their enormous armaments within small limits. We should not then see the sad spectacle of 5,000,000 of men, in the prime of life and strength, wasting their existence in standing sentinel, and inhaling the demoralizing atmosphere of the camp, garrison and barracks.

What the gain to the industrial arts would be if these men were restored to their homes and to the duties of civil life, it is not easy to calculate; but there would be this result, the world would begin to perceive that wars are unnecessary and unjustifiable, unless purely defensive. The people who now suffer cruel privations in order to support myriads of soldiers, would feel the difference in their pocket, and, having once got rid of the burden, would not willingly submit to its being reimposed. As it is, they are beginning to perceive that war is becoming a thing of the past, just as absolute monarchy is, and that there is no real patriotism in military glory.

It may surprise some to be told that such sentiments as these are gaining ground in France, the nation, of all others, the most imbued with the martial spirit, and that they are openly advocated. Nevertheless such is the fact, notwithstanding the Emperor's jealousy and distrust of every thing calculated to shake the prestige of his main stay, the army. Not many days since, a crowded and enthusiastic meeting was held in Paris under the auspices of the illustrious Michael Chevalier, Frederic Passy, Père Hyacinthe, and other members of the International League of Peace, to give vent to their opinions on the subject. The foreign papers say that Mr. Chevalier's speech on this occasion touched upon all the sore points of the present moment, and created the most unequivocal enthusiasm. A storm of sympathy greeted the following words: "What is monstrous, is to see Europe arming against herself. This state of things must cease. The future belongs to deliberative assemblies, deliberating freely under the guard of public opinion, which is, in fact, the only sovereign and controlling power." And M. Passy followed this up by adverting to the rapid progress which these views were making. "A year ago," said he, "we were discouraged on all sides." "What is the use of speaking?" was the argument used then; "you are alone in your opinion." What is said to us now is, "There is no more need of speaking, for everybody thinks as you do."

These sentiments were openly uttered to hundreds of persons within a very short distance from the Tuileries, and, of course, within hearing of the thousand and one police spies

who infest every spot in Paris; and there can be no doubt they were duly repeated to the Emperor—perhaps with exaggeration. Whether he was annoyed or not, does not appear. At all events he has had the wisdom to take no notice of them. Perhaps he ridicules the idea that war will soon become a thing of the past, and persists in maintaining his army on a war footing, to be ready for all contingencies. Perhaps—which is more likely—he feels that his government is becoming more and more unpopular, and that when once its prestige is gone, he will have nothing but the army to fall back upon.

But there is no mistaking the signs of the times. Public opinion advances with giant strides, and the soldiers themselves cannot remain wholly unaffected by it. Besides, there is the cruel conscription, which annually carries off one half of the young men who are twenty years of age, to serve in the army for periods ranging from five to nine years and a half. This is detested and dreaded everywhere, both by parents and sons; nor is it until the conscript has become accustomed to barrack life that he relishes it. He can save nothing out of his miserable pay of two sous a day, but he is found in clothes, lodging and provisions, and at the age of thirty he returns home without a cent in his pocket, demoralized, and unfitted for a farmer's life; or else he enlists as a professional soldier and tool of the Government, having but few sympathies with the people and caring but little for anything but the good opinion of his officers and his comrades.

There is no occasion to dwell upon the manifest evils of the present system; but the advocates of peace, good, brave and zealous as they are, will, it is to be feared, have a hard road to travel before they reach the Jordan of their aspirations. Should they succeed, they will change the face of affairs throughout the civilized world. Then disarming and the abolition of all standing armies will be the affair of a season. Let us hope that the good time is not far distant. "When man to man, the world o'er, shall brothers be, and a' that."—*Phila. Ledger*, Aug 3.

THE WAR IN ITALY

IN 1859.

Respecting the losses of the Italian War, we do not possess any such comprehensive works as those which have afforded such valuable aid in our reviews of the Crimean Expedition. Dr. Chenu is now preparing a work on this subject; and, pending its publication, we are limited to a critical study of various official papers which, in too many cases, bear indications of haste and confusion. We shall take for our chief guide the paper read by Baron Larrey to the Academy of Medicine, with numerous corrections from subsequent statistics, furnished either by distinguished statisticians and surgeons, or derived from recent ministerial documents.

The general estimate which has been reached as to the total losses in the Italian War, including persons killed, wounded, and missing in the three armies, is as follows, viz. 38,650 Austrians, 17,775 Frenchmen, 6,575 Sardinians; total, 63,000. These results have been obtained by the researches of one of our most distinguished military statisticians, M. Boudin, editor of the "Journals of Medicine and Military Surgery." This general amount of the losses, however, is only estimated at 61,978, according to official despatches collected by Col. Saget, the head of the historical and statistical department of the Ministry of War. The discrepancy between these two estimates is only 1,022; and it should be remarked that in Col. Saget's papers no account has been taken of a considerable number

of missing and wounded men whose recovery has not been notified to the hospitals.

The greatest confusion is indicated in some of these official returns. At Magenta, for example, certain official dispatches return the number of killed and wounded at only 3,223; subsequent dispatches raise the number to 4,535, including, it is true, the missing, most of whom were eventually found among the dead. It is the same as regards Solferino, where the first calculation of the killed and wounded in the French Army was 8,530, an amount which was increased in later documents to 11,670 private soldiers, and 720 officers in addition. In such cases the larger and more recent returns are the more correct. "The statistics of the dead," says Dr. Larrey, "appear to be more difficult to ascertain than those of the wounded. Whilst giving, in the first place, from the official returns, a total of 8,084 men as killed on the field of battle alone in the armies of France, Sardinia, and Austria, those statistics include, so far as the French army is concerned, the number of persons who, throughout the campaign, died of wounds or of disease. But how large a number died subsequently, and how many, who were reported as missing, may have been drowned in rivers, or have perished in some other way."

During the campaign itself, disease exercised but little influence on our army; but during the subsequent occupation of Italy, and the return to France, it made many victims. *The mortality then caused "appears to have exceeded, in the French army, the number of men killed on the field of battle."*—(Larrey.) "We are dropping our men at all the hospitals along the route!" exclaimed a regimental doctor, on the return of the army.

A publication, emanating from the General Statistical Board of France, gives us the following information respecting the deaths in the French army in 1859:—

	In France.	In Algeria.	In Italy.	In Rome.	Total.
Died on the field of battle, or in ambulances	32	54	5,872	0	5,868
Died in hospitals	5,835	2,361	4,360	84	12,640
Suicides	112	24	31	0	167
Totals	5,979	2,439	10,263	84	18,675

The 10,263 soldiers who died in Italy were certainly not the only victims of that war; to these must be added the number of those who, after the campaign, entered the French hospitals to sink under the wounds and diseases received during the expedition. These must have been very numerous, if we receive the statements of Dr. Larrey, and if we follow the plan adopted by all military statisticians, by Dr. Cheneu, Dr. Læffleur, and the authors of the English reports on the Eastern War, we ought also to add the number of those who, in the year following the close of the campaign, perished from its consequences. We cannot, then, hesitate to admit that the Italian War cost the lives of at least 15,000 Frenchmen.

Then, as to the other combatants, we must bear in mind that, for several reasons, such as the greater precision of our weapons, the larger calibre of our projectiles, and the disorder inseparable from defeat, the mortality from wounds must have been incalculably greater in the Austrian army

than in the French. The deaths from disease must also have been far more numerous in the enemy's camp than in ours, from the more excessive fatigue of the troops and the deficiency of provisions. After the battle of Solferino the overcrowded hospitals of Verona were swept by typhus and contagious corruption. Turning our attention to the Italian army, we find from observations of Dr. Cazlas, that from several causes, there was comparatively a much greater mortality from wounds among their troops than in the French army.

Considering all these circumstances, we may legitimately conclude that, inasmuch as the number of our troops killed by the fire of the enemy and by disease was 15,000, the total loss of life in the three armies from those causes, and from deaths through fatigue and privation, must have amounted to forty-five or fifty thousand!

PECUNIARY LOSSES BY THE ITALIAN WAR.

From losses of life we turn to losses of money. We shall not here meet with those formidable lines of figures which encountered us in our investigation of the Crimean War; but we shall enter into certain details relative to the disastrous expedients, to which an empire in extremity was obliged to have recourse in order to meet the ruinous expenses in which it had been involved by its unwarrantable pride. We shall analyze closely those burdensome contrivances which the evil genius of Austrian finance suggested to her. We shall see the abyss of paper-money and of national deficit open before us and become deeper and deeper, and shall perceive that the war in Lombardy was, both as regards Austria and Italy, if not the first and only cause, at any rate the principal source, of the economic and financial confusion which continues to arrest the commercial and industrial progress of two great nations, and which still deprives them of the spirit of enterprise, and condemns them to inaction and wretchedness. We shall also witness the counter-stroke of war upon the neutral Powers, and shall watch loans and extraordinary credits drawing successively within its deadly coil all the German States, and the contagion of armaments and foolish military expenditure spreading itself even among those whose situation should render them safe from any fear of war.

FRANCE.—So far as France is concerned, the debts authorized at first by the Budget Law for the Ministry of War in 1859, amounted to 337,447,500 francs. Successive imperial decrees added the following supplementary debts:

	France
Decree of July 2, 1859	850,000
" July 14, "	131,360,000
" Aug. 17, "	24,470,000
" " "	23,500,000
" Dec. 11, "	26,330,000
" Feb. 18, 1860	9,380,000
Total	215,940,000
From this there must be deducted the debts annulled by the decrees of Feb. 18 and 28, 1860	30,122,000
Balance of debts sanctioned by decrees	185,818,000
Two former debts, authorized by special laws March 31 and June 4, 1859, amounted to	90,158,691
	276,018,691
This gives, with the Budget, a total of	613,466,191
To this must be added for closed accounts	7,350,475
Making the Army Budget of 1859 amount to	620,816,666

This amount was never before surpassed, except in two instances, those of 1855 and 1856, when in the first case the expenses of the army budget rose to 865 millions, and in the second to 693 millions. The total expenses in the navy budget of 1859 were 213,800,000 francs, and those for Algeria and the Colonies 39,600,000. This is 92 millions more than in the preceding years of peace. The Ministry of War had required 283 millions more than the normal amount in time of Peace.

We are thus enabled to estimate the expenses of France for the Italian War at 375½ millions (£15,020,000). It is evident that the loan of 500 millions was far from being absorbed. The special budget of public works, voted June 26, 1860, authorized the application, for great works of general utility, "of the funds of the loan then remaining unabsorbed."

AUSTRIA.—This Italian War imposed still greater sacrifices upon Austria. On the very day of the crossing of the Ticino (April 29) the *Vienna Gazette* announced to the Austrian people that a decree dated April 11, had authorized the Bank of Vienna to refuse specie payments for its notes, and to enforce its paper currency. The Bank repaid this favor by a loan of 134 million florins (£13,400,000) on the security of a public debt of 200 million florins to be contracted on the first suitable occasion. But this was merely an initiative measure, as a commencement of the business.

The impossibility of having immediate recourse to a public loan necessitated the levying of heavy duties. The accumulation of taxation was pushed to its utmost limits, and extended to every source of revenue. The decrees in the month of May embraced every province. Hungary, which had hitherto been exempted from taxes on wine and butcher's meat, was now assessed for these articles. Throughout the empire the taxes on articles of consumption were increased 20 per cent. In the economy of nations, as in that of individuals, in proportion as the development of general wealth is diminished, the greater is the extent to which the expenses of consumption, strictly so termed, (the consumption of food), encroach upon the total income of individuals or communities. These excessive taxes upon butcher's meat, corn, wine, and beer, weigh much more heavily on the people of Austria than they would on the population of France or England. The duty upon salt, largely increased since 1850, was again raised. The poorer classes of Austria were already paying an annual average of 33 million florins upon salt; they were henceforth required to pay 38 million florins (£3,400,000).

The decrees which so rigorously taxed articles of consumption, also extended to business matters, and increased the charges on all fees, stamps, entries and registration. The increase varied from 15 to 40 per cent., and this at a time when the stagnation of business and the depreciations and changes of currency already rendered transactions very difficult and hazardous.

Another decree equally increased the direct taxation, not only for the whole continuance of the war, but also during

"the extraordinary state of affairs brought about by the events of the war." The tax on cultivated land, already ranging from 12 to 16 per cent., was augmented one sixth, as was also the duty on rentals. The tax on country residences, or class-tax, was raised one-half. The industrial taxation, laying burdens upon manufacturers, traders, and artisans, and also the income tax, were increased one-fifth. What suffering and misery were thus laid upon the people for the presumed honor of the House of Hapsburg!

But nothing equalled the grievance of paper-money, and the sufferings springing from this source. It has been well remarked that the depreciation of paper money appears to be subject to a law analogous to that which regulates the rapid descent of a mass of rock falling from a mountain. It proceeds according to a geometrical progression. The paper of the United States, during the Secession War, was maintained for a long time at a loss of one fifth or a fourth. Then it rapidly descended to a depreciation of one-half, and still more rapidly to a depreciation of two-thirds. If the South had been less exhausted, and could have continued the war one year longer, the loss upon "greenbacks" would probably have been five-sixths.—Michael Chevalier in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of June 1, 1866.

Austria, in 1859, was in a similar position. She was compelled to procure effective resources, in others words, gold and silver. On the 25th of May, 1859, she forced on the Lombard and Venetian people a specie loan of 75 millions. The city of Venice could only pay the first instalment by increasing taxation on income and industrial occupation 85 per cent., and by adding several additional kreutzers (halfpence) to the already extreme burden of the tax on rentals. *Every imaginable expedient was devised to gain possession of all the gold and silver in the empire.* The State which paid only in paper, demanded by a decree of the 29th of April that the custom-house charges should be paid only in specie. This was the ruin of the foreign trade. The merchant, who was already paying an exchange rate of from 30 to 50 per cent. upon the price of goods bought abroad, now had to pay a similar rate upon the specie required for fees at the custom-house. The last of these ruinous decrees was to involve *bankruptcy*. The state was irresistibly borne on to it. On the 11th of June, a decree suspended the payment of metallic currency throughout the period during which the extraordinary circumstances involved by the war should continue. It was indeed time that the Peace of Villafranca should be conceded.

On the return of peace the Bank was more than ever unable to resume payments in specie. *With a specie total of 79 million florins, it had circulated notes for 453 millions!* The augmentations of taxation, terrible as they were, were maintained indefinitely by the decree of December 1859. The army budget had become immoderately swelled. It was 106 million florins in 1858. In 1859 it rose to 292 millions, an increase of 186 million florins (£19,200,000). But this was only to meet the expenses of 1859. The army budget of 1860 shows 138 millions of ordinary, and 36 millions of extraordinary, expenses, in all, more than

174 millions; consequently it exceeded by 68 million florins the army budget of 1858. The budget of 1861, on the contrary, manifestly approaches the budget of 1858, which may be considered the normal budget of the army department in time of peace. The special expenses of Austria for the Italian War are therefore 186 million florins spent in 1859, and, in addition, 68 millions which were not paid till 1860;—a total of 254 million florins (or about £26,000,000).

But these figures afford no correct idea of the burdens of the population. The interruptions of trade and industry, the taxable resources devoured by the treasury, the variations of currency, the disadvantages of exchange—all these disasters were to become *chronic maladies* for Austria. Such was the cost of a false plea of honor. To estimate the state of ruin to which the military system, which terminated in the war of 1859, had brought this noble and great empire, we must compare its financial condition during the twelve years from 1848 to 1859, inclusive, with the preceding period. The period of six years from 1842 to 1848 had furnished an almost equal balance of revenue and expenditure. "We may hence conclude," says Horn, "the expenditure, during this period, was established upon a reasonable basis, and that if, from that time, it had only augmented in proportion to revenue, the twelve years from 1848 to 1859 would have afforded a result not less satisfactory. The difference between this allowable expenditure, as we may term it, and the actual expenditure, represents, therefore, in each particular department, the proportion of debt incurred in regard to the total deficiency. Calculations established on this basis would show us that, out of the total deficit of 1,232 million florins, the charges of civil administration have involved 153 million florins, the war department 868 millions, and the interest of the debt 211 millions. The latter liability, having been necessitated by the extravagant increase of the administrative and military expenses, ought to be divided between these two departments in proportion to their respective deficiencies. The proportions in the general deficit will then be 185 million florins for the civil administration, and 1047 million florins (£108,000,000) for the military administration."

Hence the faults of the House of Hapsburg cost Austria 108 millions pounds sterling in twelve years. Through its persistency in retaining under a despotic sceptre an unwilling population, and through its excessive susceptibility to vanity and imaginary honor, the Austrian nation has had to suffer in expiation nearly 3,000 million francs (£120,000,000) of accumulated debt, irrespective of an incalculable amount of loss and private ruin.

ITALY.—It is to be regretted that young Italy cannot be adduced as a contrast to old Austria. But, unfortunately, liberal and united Italy owes its origin as such to war. She is suffering, and will long continue to suffer, the penalty of this mistake or fatality of her establishment. For years to come she will have to struggle with the deficit which war has created, and with the financial and industrial difficulties brought about through military expendi-

ture. This disorganization of all the productive strength of the Peninsula began with the contest of 1859, and was completed by that of 1866.

The little State of *Piedmont*, so full of life and vigor, had been for a long period preyed upon by its armaments. It stood continually armed for fight, distracted from works of peace, and steadily looking towards the Ticino and the Po, which it appeared waiting to cross. Its usual condition was that critical state termed by the Germans *Kriegsbereitschaft*, readiness for war. The budget of 1859, drawn up in view of peace, and presented on the 22d of February, 1858, to the Sardinia legislature, when there was no indications of approaching war, exhibited a deficit of 12 millions. How largely this was to be augmented by the war! Before the commencement of hostilities, the Government at Turin contracted a loan of 50 million *liras*, (a *lira* is a Piedmontese coin worth about 9½d., or nearly equivalent to the French franc.) Austria had borrowed as much in London, also, before the opening of the struggle; and here commences a truly curious parallel between the financial administration of Austria and that of Piedmont.

On the very day on which the *Vienna Gazette* published an imperial decree establishing the compulsory currency, (April 29, 1859) the Turin Government, as if acting in concert with that of Vienna, liberated the National Bank from the obligation of paying its notes, and gave them a forced currency, in consideration of a loan of 30 million *liras* at 2 per cent. Subsequently the same privilege was extended to the Bank of Genoa, in return for a loan of 5 millions. Thus, on the 29th of April, both at Vienna and Turin, the governments inflicted on the people the calamity of paper-money. And in Piedmont, as in Austria, this was merely an initiative measure. It also became necessary to raise the taxation: a royal decree augmented it at the general rate of 10 per cent; and this increase, as always happens, continued after the war.

Notwithstanding the loan of 50 millions contracted before the opening of hostilities, and the new loan of 100 millions contracted during the war, and although the debt of this little Piedmont, which was 800 millions before the war, had been raised to nearly 1,000 millions, and notwithstanding, also, all the taxation, there resulted, as in Austria, a considerable deficit. According to the report presented by M. Galeotti, on behalf of the commission which had been appointed to consider a demand for the authorization of a new loan of 150 millions in 1860, the financial account of 1859 had left a total of 104,399,956 francs. The war of 1859 had cost Piedmont 255 million francs, in addition to the increase of 10 per cent upon all taxation, and irrespective of the incalculable evils of paper-money.

France spent 375½ millions (£15,000,000,) Piedmont, 255 millions (£10,200,000,) and Austria 650 millions (£26,000,000;) making a total of 1,280½ millions (£51,200,000.) But this was by no means the sum of the expenses occasioned by that war. We must also take into account the outlay of Germany upon special armaments.

GERMANY.—It is well known that the war of 1859 aroused a great excitement in Germany, that suddenly old animosities were revived, and that a convulsion of anger agitated all the Germanic populations throughout the territory of the Confederation. Hence originated extensive warlike preparations which necessitated supplementary credits and loans.

In *Prussia*, the law of May 21st, 1859, which provided for the possibly necessary contingency of calling out the army during the course of the year, authorized the Minister of Finance to increase 25 per cent. the income tax, the land tax, and the corn and timber taxes. The Cabinet Council of June 14th, which ordered the calling-out of six battalions, was immediately followed by the above increase of taxation, which continued long after the end of the war. A second law, also passed on the 21st of May, authorized the government to incur every expense which might be rendered necessary by the "Kriegsbereitschaft," readiness for war. According to this permission, the government might borrow money to the extent of 40 million thalers (£6,000,000.) A royal order, of May 26th, immediately prescribed the negotiation of a loan of 30 million thalers (£4,500,000).

The expenses of the smaller German States were in proportion much greater than those of Prussia. In the *Grand Duchy of Baden*, the special military expenses, in consequence of the "Marschbereitschaft," preparation for war, amounted to 4,257,000 florins (£364,400). This was provided for by the appropriation of money raised for the construction of railways, the completion of which was accordingly postponed. On the 7th of June, the Chambers of *Hesse Darmstadt* unanimously voted a loan of 4 million florins (£333,333). *Electoral Hesse* had voted a loan of 700,000 thalers (£105,000), which was exhausted by the end of June, 1859, and the government then demanded a fresh loan of 1,300,000 thalers (£171,000). *Wurtemberg* raised by loan 7 million florins (£583,333). In *Hanover*, the special military expenses amounted to 11 1-2 million francs. In *Saxony*, subsidies were voted of 5,636,725 thalers (\$845,508). In *Bavaria*, the loans for special armaments reached to 80 million francs. Hence, for these seven secondary States, we have an expense of 152 million francs. If to this we add the expenses of Prussia and those of the other smaller States, respecting which latter we have not been able to procure positive information, the costs of the three belligerent Powers are found to be 1,280 million francs, and the total expenses of both belligerents and neutrals 1,500 million francs (£60,000,000).

We have, then, a cost of 60 million pounds sterling imposed on the finances of Central Europe; heavy taxes, temporarily levied at first, but ultimately rendered permanent by the course of events; the augmentation of war-budgets, which never completely returned to their previous level, and the commercial and industrial disorganization of Italy and Austria. These constitute the penalty paid by Europe for that very short war, which, by the exercise of a little good feeling on the part of the government at Vienna, might have been so easily avoided.

VICTORY OF BLENHEIM.

It was a summer evening,
Old Kaspar's work was done,
And he before his cottage door
Was sitting in the sun;
And by him sported on the green
His little grandchild Wilhelmine.

She saw her brother Peterkin
Roll something large and round,
Which he beside the rivulet
In playing there had found;
He came to ask what he had found,
That was so large, and smooth, and round.

Old Kaspar took it from the boy
Who stood expectant by;
And then the old man shook his head,
And with a natural sigh,
" 'Tis some poor fellow's skull," said he,
" Who fell in the great victory."

" I find them in the garden,
For there's many here about;
And often when I go to plough,
The ploughshare turns them out,
For many thousand men," said he,
" Were slain in the great victory."

" Now tell us what 'twas all about,"
Young Peterkin he cries;
And little Wilhelmine looks up
With wonder-waiting eyes;
" Now tell us all about the war,
And what they fought each other for."

" It was the English," Kaspar cried,
" Who put the French to rout;
But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out;
But every body said," quoth he,
" That 'twas a famous victory."

" My father lived at Blenheim then,
Yon little stream hard by;
They burnt his dwelling to the ground,
And he was forced to fly;
So with his wife and child he fled,
Nor had he where to rest his head."

" With fire and sword the country round
Was wasted far and wide,
And many a childing mother then
And new-born baby died;
But things like that, you know, must be
At every famous victory."

" They say it was a shocking sight
After the field was won;
For many thousand bodies here
Lay rotting in the sun;
But things like that, you know, must be
After a famous victory."

" Great praise the duke of Marlbro' won,
And our good Prince Eugene."
" Why, 'twas a very wicked thing!"
Said little Wilhelmine;
" Nay, nay, my little girl," quoth he,
" It was a famous victory."

" And every body praised the Duke,
Who this great fight did win."
" But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
" Why, that I cannot tell," said he,
" But 'twas a famous victory."

R. Southey.